In my post of August 20, 2017, I discussed Harry Gensler’s proposal that the ideas that are termed the Golden Rule and the Silver Rule are logically identical. I have written in several posts that I believe that analysis (which others also propose) is incorrect.
Here I want to take a different approach to that argument.
I’ll quote here again Gensler’s proposal:
“10.4 Both are equivalent
The fourth view, which I accept, says that positive and negative GRs are logically equivalent: any action prescribed by one will be prescribed by the other. It’s easy to derive the negative GR from the positive. Take this positive GR:
If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X.
We can replace “do A” with any action description, such as “omit doing B”: If you want X to omit doing B to you, then omit doing B to X. This is equivalent to the negative GR:
“If you want X not to do B to you, then don’t do B to X.”
Similarly, let’s start with this negative GR:
If you want X not to do A to you, then don’t do A to X.
Since “do A” can stand for any action, substitute “omit doing B” for it:
If you want X not to omit doing B to you, then don’t omit doing B to X.
Simplifying double negations gives the positive GR:
“If you want X to do B to you, then do B to X.”
So the positive and negative GR are logically equivalent.
Any action can be described either positively or negatively: so being honest can be described as not lying. And then the positive GR with the positive description is equivalent to the negative GR with the negative description:
“As you want others to be honest toward you, be honest toward them”
is equivalent to
“As you want others not to lie to you, do not lie to them.”
The proposal that Gensler presents implicitly assumes that I must take some action toward you. That is, I must either lie to you or tell you the truth. If those are my only options, the proposal has merit.
But the condition described is a limited one. It requires some action on my part that will have an effect specifically on you.
But, why is it appropriate to limit the analysis to only that subset of possibilities?
And why are my only options to lie or to tell the truth?
First, if I refrain from a given behavior, I refrain from it with respect to everyone comprising the group that might possibly be affected.
Let’s use a more concrete example.
When I decide I will not use physical violence, as a matter of principle, because it would be hateful to me if I were subject to it, my conscious decision, my forbearance, affects everyone equally. It is not just that I don’t strike the person standing next to me.
In fact, it could as easily be said that, if I take no action toward the person standing next to me, that I did not strike him, I did not lie to him, I did not pick his pocket, I did not purposely spill my coffee on him, and so on.
The things I did not do to him comprise the entire set of things that I could have done to him, given that he was standing next to me, but did not do.
If we accept the Gensler rationale, we limit the value of restraint to the relatively small set of instances in which I am compelled to act in a specific circumstance. I think that is inappropriate.
A commitment to avoid a destructive behavior has an effect on, at least, all of those who might have been subject to its impact. Arguably, the effects actually multiply far beyond the set of those who might be directly affected because those who have not been subject to destructive behavior will be less likely to subject others to destructive behavior.
This is another approach, in my view, to arguing against the positive-negative equality proposal of Gensler and others.
©Charles R. Lightner