Material quoted here is drawn from the paper by Adam Cureton, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee and Thomas E. Hill, Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, which was published in “Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology and Psychology” edited by Nancy E. Snow, Oxford University Press, 2015.
This is a most useful paper! Cureton and Hill draw broadly from Kant’s works as well as from those of others to create a broader-than-usual context for the interpretation and use of the Categorical Imperative.
For our purposes their discussion of virtue in its relationship to duty, and of the duty to act on duty, provides a very helpful view of Kant’s structure of actions. Actions proceed from principles and principles proceed from virtues and virtues proceed from duties, and, critically Virtue and Duty (I’ll capitalize those for our purposes) proceed from moral law.
But there is also a parallel between the sources and expressions of both Virtue and Duty that seems to leave an open question. While Kant recognizes many virtues and duties, he also holds that there is a fundamental Virtue and a fundamental Duty from which the others proceed. At times it seems the authors suggest Virtue precedes Duty and at other time the reverse seems to be their view. That ambiguity will be found in some of the quoted material below and will require further investigation.
As to virtue: the authors find that Kant’s understanding of virtue is “quite distinctive and has considerable merit compared to most familiar conceptions.”
“In Kant’s mature works, the ideal of virtue is to have a good will with the strength of will to do one’s duty despite any opposing inclinations.” So here it seems that duty exists prior to virtue, since virtue is that which is necessary to doing one’s duty. “…a good will is a will to do one’s duty regardless of any contrary inclinations.”
The point is made specifically here:
“Kant distinguishes virtue, which is the strength of will to fulfill all of our duties from a sense of duty, from specific virtues, which are commitments to particular moral ends.” And … “Kant therefore holds that there is only one virtuous disposition, which is a second-order readiness to do our duty from duty…”
So, the fundamental Virtue is preceded by Duty and generates or represents the willingness to do what is required by duty because that is one’s Duty. The root from which all of man’s action springs, then, is Duty. But what gives rise to Duty?
“All duties, according to Kant, are united by the moral law…” Does moral law then proceed the singular (capital D) Duty? It does seem so. And if so, what can be said about that?
“In the Doctrine of Virtue he (Kant) presents his account of the moral duty of every competent moral agent to cultivate virtue.”
I go to a source outside the current paper for a view on that question.
The source of moral law is “human nature, human freedom, human reason…The test of a genuine moral imperative — the test of the moral law — is that I can universalize it, that I can will that it become a universal law. This ‘test’ is what the Categorical Imperative is for — to provide us a way to examine the rationality and therefore moral acceptability of an action.”
From an online textbook by Stephen O Sullivan and Philip A. Pecorino 2002.
Moral law, then, gives rise to Duty. Virtue, then, seems to be the third element in the chain of action.
At this point Kant appears to be constructing an ontological system but this is only the base on which he builds further.
The singular Duty is expressed further in multiple, more specific duties in multiple categories, of which ethical duties represents one category. And…” ethical duties are a third class of duty; they include all duties of virtue along with an indirect duty to do all of our duties of right from the motive of duty.” We see here again the idea of doing one’s duty for the proper motive.
The singular Virtue is expressed further in multiple virtues. It is not clear from the text whether the authors see that the multiplication of virtues precede, follow from or are coincident with the multiplication of duties. In fact, they use the phrase “duty of virtue”, which might be interpreted in any of the three possibilities.
Here, though, the continued expansion of Kant’s system becomes deontological, or expressed in specific principles. Cureton and Hill provide a listing and explanation of both virtues and vices.
“Self-preservation is the virtue of preserving our lives, freedom, and rational capacities;
self-respect is the virtue of valuing ourselves as persons with dignity;
honesty is the virtue of scrutinizing ourselves and communicating our thoughts to others;
thrift is the virtue of procuring and utilizing the means necessary for cheerfully enjoying the pleasures of life;
self-improvement is the virtue of striving to perfect our natural and moral powers;
beneficence is the virtue of setting the permissible ends of others as our own;
gratitude is the virtue of honoring a benefactor for a kindness she has done for us;
sympathy is the virtue of actively sharing in the feelings of others;
sociability is the virtue of associating with others and forming friendships; and
forgiveness is the virtue of not seeking or hoping for vengeance for wrongs done by others.”
Providing a definition of each of the virtues listed is critical to creating principles of behavior required to do one’s duty with respect to the acquisition and strengthening of that virtue.
And likewise, for vices, the authors write:
“Kant’s list of vices is more robust than is commonly recognized. Kant offers his own conception of the seven deadly sins, for example:
lust is the vice of surrendering ourselves to our sexual instincts;
drunkenness and gluttony are vices of impairing our rational faculties;
avarice or greed is the vice of procuring the means for enjoyment but not utilizing them and leaving one’s true needs unmet;
laziness is the vice of refusing to develop and utilize our natural powers;
vengefulness is the vice of seeking or hoping for revenge for a wrong;
envy is the vice of seeking to diminish the well-being of others because it is greater than one’s own; and
arrogance is the vice of demanding others lose respect for themselves and respect us more.
Other vices, according to Kant, include suicide, asceticism, servility, destroying feelings that promote morality, tempting others to immorality, malice, contempt, defamation, and ridicule.”
If we combine the virtues and vices that the authors attribute to Kant, the promotion of the former and the avoidance of the latter create a list similar to that of Benjamin Franklin’s.
That Kant’s system unfolds into a fully deontological one is clear from one of the criticisms leveled against it.
“Finally, Kant’s moral theory may seem to be a rigoristic and burdensome system of rules that leaves little or no room for judgment, inventiveness, or sensitivity to context and uncertainty.”
The following are points made by the authors that are of particular interest to us:
“To become more virtuous is not an easy task, and it requires time and practice, as well as self-scrutiny. The aim is not merely to avoid wrongdoing and to pursue moral ends but also to do so for the right reasons. What a virtuous person wills to do, more specifically, is determined by the system of ethical principles, which includes, for example, duties to others of love, respect, gratitude, and friendship, as well as duties to ourselves to avoid suicide, lying, drunkenness, and servility.”
The specific reference to required “time and practice” is one that clearly appears in other virtue-based systems. The specification of “right reasons” provides the contrast to the utilitarian view. And the idea that a virtue will convert ethical principles into right action in some nearly inevitable way is important. That is, if virtue has been truly cultivated, it will cause the expression of the moral law through action according to the correct principles.
The reference to practice and self-scrutiny as a requirement to progress in virtue cultivation aligns with the idea of a reflective/corrective practice we’ve discussed under The Ethic of Repair.
“We are all to some extent morally weak, lacking full virtue—the strength of will to do our duty always and for the right reasons. Kant implies that it is our duty to cultivate virtue in this sense, but this takes time and effort. Perfect virtue is an end to which we should aspire but cannot fully achieve (in this life at least).”
This idea of perfection as aspirational is similar to the argument we’ve made in prior posts about the “commandment” to “love your neighbor as yourself”. We’ve presented the argument from Hebrew grammar and we’ve commented on the aspirational, versus commanded, nature of that admonition. The idea of perfect virtue is similar and it’s interesting that Kant expresses it.
“The primary question of ethics is ‘What ought I to do?’ and this question arises only when we have reason to believe that what we do is up to us—a choice among options that we have, not something beyond our control (as this is commonly understood). Whether to have various natural dispositions and feelings is not typically among our options for choice, and so their presence or absence is not a measure of how well we are doing what we ought to do or an essential criterion for the worth of our acts and character.”
It does seem that the idea presented of cultivating virtue would suggest that we make efforts to alter “natural dispositions” that run counter to the ideal.
“A related feature of Kant’s theory of virtue that is not shared by all is that moral goodness and virtue do not depend on one’s accomplishments or success in achieving the good results that one earnestly strives for.”
Here, again, Kant is contrasted with the utilitarians. It is not that consequences do not matter but that in judging the goodness of action, what “one earnestly strives for” is more important for Kant than “success in achieving the good results”. The good results are of greater importance for consequentialists.
We’ve quoted above the statement regarding our moral duty to cultivate virtue. On that subject the authors also state:
“… the primary reason why one should strive to improve oneself is not to enable one to fulfill duties to others but to treat one’s own humanity as an end in itself.”
Properly striving to cultivate our own “humanity as an end in itself” will presumably enable and allow us to fulfill duties to others, but it seems that is of secondary importance. Perfecting our own “humanity” appears to be presented as the primary goal which, if pursued properly, will create the situations in which our duties to others are actually acquitted. This idea again reflects the uncertainty of outcome that distinguishes Kant from the consequentialists.
The authors conclude:
“A person’s moral character, according to Kant, does not depend on her temperament, habits, or feelings but on whether she has committed herself to morality above all else and possesses the strength of will to put that commitment into practice.”
©Charles R. Lightner