Aristotle, in The Nicomachean Ethics, proposes several ideas that are significant to the structure of the ethical system we are pursuing. And David Ross, in his Introduction to and notes to the Oxford World Classics edition of that work, adds very helpful analysis.
Much of Aristotle’s work reflects his particular interest in only one class of people. Ross states that “his (Aristotle’s) assumption from the start is that the best life can be lived only by well-born, well-educated male citizens with no need to earn their own living.” Aristotle’s views on the relationships and responsibilities among members of that narrow class; and their relationships to and responsibilities toward the state, are only of peripheral interest for our purposes. But they do not critically limit the ideas discussed below.
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Aristotle was not a relativist. He insists, according to Ross, “on moral objectivity, while denying universality”. At the same time, he is unclear – or, perhaps better – leaves room for discussion or interpretation regarding “what the basis of these objective moral truths is…”
Ross suggests:
“Aristotle would, I think, simply reject outright the demand for a criterion for right action. He expects a well-brought-up person to have a pretty good idea of what features and considerations are relevant to acting well in any given situation, and these considerations will be of many and various kinds…”
That doesn’t mean he doesn’t propose and discuss specific virtues. He does. But his conclusions are general. Discussion of attributes of character and habits of mind are at least one step removed from the actions that illustrate them.
His position is in some respects like that of Bentham who suggested that “we” have come to understand what is generally right behavior over lengthy periods of time so that, in most cases, a sober adult will “just know”, essentially as a result of many generations of accumulated and disseminated common experience, what is correct and incorrect, appropriate and inappropriate.
This suggests that what is required is a set of broad, thematic or schematic principles that a person interprets according to the requirements of the specific situation encountered. That is not unlike most structures of legal and moral principles that proceed from a general requirement ex: “thou shalt not kill”, which is then elaborated upon in increasingly specific detail.
Aristotle writes: “…the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely…the accounts that we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter.”
2. The virtues that a person of good character will exhibit should reflect those moral principles a person holds. Aristotle taught that “moral virtue, like the arts, is acquired by the repetition of corresponding acts”.“Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities…” “Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.”
Aristotle believed that we must practice being moral, being virtuous. That virtue is cultivated by the doing of virtuous acts, not by being taught about it and not by reading about it.
This is a key point. It is actual personal experience that cultivates virtue in man. It is practice.
This is key because the essence of practice is continual correction. If I miss the target I adjust my next attempt (whatever sort of activity you choose here the principle is the same). I then observe the effect of that adjustment and, if needed, I adjust further. And` so on, until I hit the target.
This continual feedback and adjustment is precisely the activity suggested in The Ethic of Reflection. I periodically review my behavior and its results against the standards I have accepted and, if I have failed to meet those standards my assessment is fed back into my behavioral decision-making to correct at the next opportunity.
Aristotle compares the activity of learning virtue to that of learning to play the lyre or to build a boat. And in acknowledging that a just action can be performed by an unjust person he illustrates the essential dynamic of practice.
It is not that we demonstrate competence, it is that we strive to continually reduce the degree of our error.
3. Aristotle makes a useful distinction in his accounts of justice, between distributive justice and rectificatory justice. Rectificatory justice concerns matters between individuals and (quoting Ross) “…instead of discussing just punishment, as we might expect, he focuses on making things right for the victim…”
While Aristotle is discussing a function of the state in this case, the distinction is still a useful one for our purposes since it parallels the idea that a wrong done between individuals requires rectification. In our notion of the Ethic of Repair, that rectification is a private matter, while in Aristotle’s discussion it is a public one. It is made more relevant when coupled with the idea of an offense being an error in the practice of a virtue.
Just as an adjustment is made when, in practice, an attempt fails to hit the mark, in relations between persons rectification is required when an action falls short of the requirements of virtue.
Aristotle’s ethical ideas help in understanding other important issues of relationships among parties, which we’ll discuss in subsequent posts. But his points on the three issues discussed above are very useful.
©Charles R. Lightner