Having at least a schematic framework for the topics to be discussed in The Ethic of Restraint and The Ethic of Repair, I’ve moved on to study of some of the issues that come up in the space between those two i.e. in The Ethic of Respect.
The Ethic of Respect deals with the ideas that have been previously labelled the Golden Rule and the Platinum Rule. These are the cases in which purposeful action is taken by one individual that is intended to affect another. It can, and must, include matters relating to restraint but its fundamental subject is the appropriate active behavior of one person towards another (or others).
The work of the contemporary philosopher, T. M. Scanlon, who argues for a form of contractualism, is of particular interest in approaching this part of our study
1. It concerns itself with the morality – the rightness or wrongness – of actions taken by individuals that affect other individuals. Scanlon’s question, and the title of his principal book on the subject, is “What We Owe to Each Other”. The authority of moral standards, for Scanlon, arises from a “mutual recognition”, which is the essence of the notion of respect as we’re using it.
2. It does not address matters relating to the individual’s obligation to the state or the state’s obligations toward the individual.
3. It does not proceed from the utilitarian idea of enhancement of collective well-being, which requires solutions to the definition and measurement of well-being whose difficulty is magnified when we attempt to solve them for a group, as opposed to an individual. Scanlon instead uses as a foundation for his analysis the idea of reasons. What does a person have reason to do?
4. Scanlon argues for the importance of choice in the analysis of the rightness or wrongness of behavior.
5. His contractualism builds from the notion of restraint in that “wrong is the moral predicate; right is defined as ‘not wrong’.”
6. Wrongness is the property of being unjustifiable, the measure of which is the mutual recognition of principles.
So, Scanlon’s work is aligned with the idea that our first requirement from our fellow man is that he do us no harm (and vice versa, of course) which Mill proposes (without then adopting Mill’s utilitarianism). Once that principle is agreed we can move on to the question of what good we are rightly obligated to do i.e. “What We Owe to Each Other”.
Scanlon’s contractualist proposition is stated as follows:
From T.M.Scanlon. “What We Owe to Each Other”. P153
“Contractualism…holds that…
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”
Later in his discussion (p269) Scanlon adds an important modification to the phrase “no one could reasonably reject…” He restates it as “…no one suitably motivated could reasonably reject…”
Stating this principle in the negative i.e. defining the wrong, which leaves all else implicitly right, might seem to ignore the question of what we positively owe to others. What are my obligations to do, as opposed to my obligations not to do? But that is not a real objection. The principles for the regulation of behavior would include those active obligations such as those we owe to family, friends, co-workers, fellow citizens, etc.
Scanlon discusses a series of Principles such, Fairness, Due Care, Loss Prevention and Established Practices. Clearly his approach proceeds from the general to the particular, but his emphasis is on those fundamental principles that underlie the myriad particular standards of behavior that become a part of the general, unforced agreement among informed individuals.
He provides the necessary exceptions under the “reasonable” term of the statement for issues such as: a) emergency cases, … b) threat cases, … c) paternalistic cases, … and d) permission cases. And further recognizes (p299) that “it would be reasonable to reject a principle that did not include such a phrase (as)…in the absence of special justification”.
Scanlon’s approach:
a) in its limitation to matters among individuals,
b) its focus on mutual recognition,
c) its incorporation of the idea of shared acceptance of principles, and
d) its acknowledgement that (at least some of) those principles will vary from place to place and group to group;
will be important for our further work on The Ethic of Respect.
©Charles R. Lightner