In an earlier post I briefly reviewed the ideas of Immanuel Kant, particularly his notion of the Categorical Imperative. Kant’s “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in which the Categorical Imperative was first proposed, was published in 1785.
Roger Scruton, writing about Kant, has said:
“The Critique of Pure Reason (published in 1781, 4 years before The Metaphysics of Morals but providing theoretical support for the Categorical Imperative) is the most important work of philosophy to have been written in modern times…”
Note: Parenthetical comment and added emphasis above are mine CRL.
Scruton, Roger. Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (p. 16). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.
Kant’s works were known to and influenced all major western philosophers of his age including those whose thoughts and system are known as Utilitarianism.
While in many respects the two systems seek the same end, they approach that end from quite different vantage points. Kant looked to the Categorical, having reference to nothing but itself, for moral truth and guidance. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is a consequentialist approach. That is, it looks to the consequences of action as reference in determining its moral correctness.
The doctrine known as Utilitarianism was proposed by the Englishman Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and further developed and articulated, by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).
Bentham’s book “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” (1786) and Mill’s book “Utilitarianism” (1863) lay out the doctrine in its original form. A number of variations on the original doctrine have been subsequently proposed.
The continued influence of Utilitarianism on modern philosophy and ethics is clear from the following statement by Professor Henry R. West, author of “An Introduction to Mills’ Utilitarian Ethics” (2004):
“As an abstract ethical doctrine, utilitarianism has established itself as one of the small number of live options that must be taken into account and either refuted or accepted by any philosopher taking a position in normative ethics.” (utilitarianism.com) (emphasis added)
While the Kantian approach and the Utilitarian one have key differences, there are also some very interesting parallels. In this post we’ll introduce the classical Utilitarian approach using, typically, the work of Mill. In subsequent notes we’ll look at a comparison of Kant and Mill (as well as other, more particular aspects of Utilitarianism).
Utilitarianism is founded on the principle of utility, which Bentham defined as follows:
“By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness.
I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. (emphasis added)
[Note: Bentham’s book was intended to provide an ethical basis for a proposed penal code and so some of his applications of the principle of utility should be understood as having that specific agenda in prospect.]
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.”
Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kindle Locations 248-256). White Dog Publishing. Kindle Edition.
He stated the principle alternatively as:
“The sum of all pleasure that results from an action, minus the suffering of anyone involved in the action.”
So, an action is good to the extent it produces more good than bad; more happiness than unhappiness.
The editor of the second edition of Mill’s Utilitarianism makes the following comment:
“In particular, the single most influential theory of the consequence-oriented variety has been that we should always perform that act, of those available, that will bring the most happiness or the least unhappiness. The principle that we should always act in this manner (taking into account both the short- and the long-term consequences of our acts and treating the happiness of other people as equal in value to our own) is known as utilitarianism; and its correctness is the main thesis of the essay of the same name by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, 2nd Edition (Annotated). Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.
Note: All quotes from Mill’s “Utilitarianism” are from the edition cited above unless otherwise identified.
The editor further states:
“In ethics, as in other areas of inquiry, a theory’s adequacy is judged in large measure by the scope and diversity of the phenomena that it can successfully explain. I have tried to show in this Introduction that despite its difficulties, Mill’s version of utilitarianism satisfies this criterion surprisingly well—as well, perhaps, as any other fully developed ethical theory that has ever been proposed.” (emphasis added)
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or the “greatest happiness principle” holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.” (Ibid p. 7)
If we ask, on what do we base the fundamental premise of Utilitarianism, Mill answers:
“No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.” (Ibid p. 35)
So, we are told that Utilitarianism:
1) is one of a very few ethical systems that any serious philosopher must consider,
2) it is as successful in its aim as any ever proposed, and
3) it, in essence, measures pleasure versus pain and favors the path of greatest pleasure; or happiness versus unhappiness and favors the greatest happiness.
Anyone contemplating this approach would ask a few critical questions, which Mill anticipates and answers:
Whose pleasure and pain?
In Mill’s words:
“…the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.” (Ibid p. 17)
So, Mill would have us assess the extent to which all parties affected by an act will perceive it as being either pleasurable or painful; quantify the pleasure and pain produced; and choose the course of action that produces the greatest net pleasure or the least net pain, in aggregate.
How do we determine what is pleasurable versus painful?
If our concern is, as stated above, “not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned”, then the determination of pleasure and pain; happiness and unhappiness; cannot be at the level of the “agent”. It, too, must be considered at the level of all concerned.
How do we determine what is pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, at the generalized level?
The answer given by Mill is essentially: the common experience of mankind accumulated over its history. As he puts it:
“Once we appreciate that past experience is a highly reliable guide to new situations, we realize that there has been ample time [for information gathering], namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependent.” Because what has been learned during this time is precisely that acts such as murder and theft are highly unlikely to promote the general happiness, we can be confident that we are following the utilitarian principle when we avoid them.” (Ibid. Introduction)
How do we measure pleasure versus pain?
To answer this question, we have to overcome two principle difficulties:
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We have to identify all of those affected, and
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We have to quantify the happiness and unhappiness caused to each of them.
And to answer b) we need to determine whether there is a qualitative difference among experiences of pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness.
Here we begin to face a limitation of the Utilitarian approach: a limitation of practical scope.
First, while it might be possible to determine which individuals or groups will be directly affected by a given act or behavior (although even that has its very real limitations) the same cannot be said of those who might be indirectly or inadvertently affected.
Some effects of an act, while ultimately traceable with a high degree of certainty to a specific source, might only be known well after the fact and only traceable through means unknown to the agent even after the fact, much less before.
If an individual acting in good faith performs an action that is, to all apparent purposes, appropriate, but that has an unintended negative effect, can the act be said to be immoral?
This is, essentially, Kant’s argument for his assertion that morality can only attach to intention because the actual results of an action can never be assured.
But Mill explains that, in fact, this misses the point. He says:
“…it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large.
The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale— in other words, to be a public benefactor—are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.”
So, Mill limits the generality of the principle, in effect exempting the individual for responsibility for effects outside the scope of those likely to be affected. That does solve a problem but it seems to do so at the expense of its broader applicability.
Recall that Bentham wrote his “Principles” with the idea that it would form the basis for a penal code. That suggests a usage within a limited population; that to which the code would apply; presumably, England, given Bentham’s nationality. The practical scope of the application, then, would be a population at least governed by the same laws and have at least somewhat uniformly-applied values.
One Englishman (a more homogeneous group in Mill’s time) is more likely able to reliably anticipate the reaction of another Englishman than he would the reaction of a desert nomad or a South Sea Islander, for example.
As to the question of qualitative differences among effects, Mill acknowledges the issue. He writes:
“It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.”
And further:
“Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.” (Ibid. p. 8).
In this regard also Mill depends on a sort of “preponderance of opinion” approach. He does not suggest that the probability of correct anticipation is 100% but implicitly accepts some element of error.
On the other hand, utility and utilitarianism are ideas that have been taken up by the economics profession in more recent decades because they appear to allow a direct quantification of individual “happiness” when that is interpreted as satisfaction. If we can assign a numeric value the level of satisfaction of every person affected by an action or decision, we than then presumably extract either a total net satisfaction or an average net satisfaction that would be a proxy for the rightness or wrongness of an action.
While I suspect that neither Bentham nor Mill would be pleased at this usage of their ideas, they do open the door to it. For example, Mill states:
“If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities.” (Ibid p. 64)
By which it seems that he believes that quantification of happiness is possible and so comparison of levels of happiness on a known mathematical scale is possible. This seems to me to contradict the idea that certainty of outcome is not possible. But here again, Mill defers to the idea of common experience. He writes:
“What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both?” (Ibid p. 11).
Bentham also allows that the same stimulus will produce different quantities of pain or pleasure in different individuals or even in the same individual at different times, depending on his experience and expectations. See here:
“The quantity of pleasure or pain, which on any given occasion a man may experience from an application of any sort, may be greatly influenced by the expectations he has been used to entertain of pleasure or pain from that quarter; but it will not be absolutely determined by them: for pleasure or pain may come upon him from a quarter from which he was not accustomed to expect it.”
Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (with linked TOC) (Kindle Locations 891-894). White Dog Publishing. Kindle Edition.
So, neither Mill nor Bentham seems to hold with the idea that individual experiences of pain and pleasure, happiness and unhappiness, can be actually quantified with any precision; rather, those levels can be broadly approximated and anticipated based on common experience of reactions observed over time.
The principle of utility and the doctrine of Utilitarianism has become so important in Western philosophy and ethics that even a general discussion will require several more posts, so I will end this first one here with a promise to return shortly.
©Charles R. Lightner