Wattles’ wonderful book on the Golden Rule, published in 1996 by the Oxford University Press, is the product of ten years of research stimulated by his work on the subject for a 1985 Stanford University Golden Rule seminar.
Harry J. Gensler, the noted Golden Rule scholar, termed Wattles’ book “the first scholarly book on the GR in English since the 17th century”.
The bulk of the book is devoted to a comprehensive survey and analysis of the history of the Rule from the time of Confucius through the 20th Century as expressed in both religious and secular streams of thought.
Wattles brings to his analysis a deep grounding in formal philosophical and ethical thinking, an equally impressive knowledge on western religious tradition, and a clarity of thought and expression that command the reader’s attention, involvement and respect.
In the last two chapters of the book, Wattles presents a case for the Rule as the basis of a philosophy of morality and as a tool and an expression of a universal religious impulse.
Wattles’ clearly strives for thoroughness in his historical presentation, which becomes a great resource for any subsequent student. Equally impressive is the evenhandedness and rigorous analysis of the dozens of expressions of the Rule that he brings.
Only after he completes his scholarly analysis of the thoughts and beliefs of others as expressed over the centuries does he step forward in his own name, in Part II of the book titled ‘An Ethics of the Golden Rule’, to present his own conclusions and personal views. (Which, interestingly, seem to have led him to leave academia for a new career in spiritual guidance.)
I wouldn’t presume to critique Wattles’ scholarly research and analysis. It is amply referenced, clearly organized and avoids agenda-bias. But I’m sure he would consider his personal interpretations; which proceed from a particular cultural and religious background and worldview; as open to comment and question. So, I’ll confine my references and analysis to Part II of the book.
As much as Wattles values the Rule he acknowledges that it is “a searchlight, not a map”. It is not the answer so much as it acts as a pointer toward appropriate answers in varying situations. “A moral principle” he writes, “is an expression of life” … “it is not a system of ethics”.
“In rigorous reasoning”, he writes,” it is normal for the golden rule to be reformulated, and it would be foolish for a defender of the rule to resist such attempts in the name of static, traditional wording.”
He allows himself to reformulate the rule as he examines some of the clear problems of its application. For example, he modifies (as others do; as all are really forced to do) the GR statement to specify “appropriate” treatment of persons and situations that are “similar”. Or, “do unto others as you would rationally desire that they do unto you in a similar situation.”
So, the true value of the rule is not in the exact wording of it as it is typically stated. In fact, no single sentence as simple as that of the typical rule statement can really be expected to present a complete prescription for moral behavior. Life is just too complicated for that.
It is actually the use of the rule as “an axiom in the derivation of moral judgments…as we mature by genuine moral inquiry” that represents its most powerful benefit. If we repeatedly ask ourselves in various ambiguous situations over time, what behavior the rule suggests “maturity is gained…by efforts in moral thinking and acting.”
“Despite its intuitive simplicity, the rule tends to engage the agent in a process of moral thinking. The most elementary leverage that the golden rule exerts is to encourage a self-centered individual toward a sympathetic regard for others.”
Now, this assumes that the “agent”, encountering a situation in which a decision about alternate possible actions is necessary, will actively seek to choose the action he takes on the basis of a rule-like analysis of possibilities.
It also assumes the “intuitive recognition…that the other (is) someone of dignity, indeed…someone of dignity comparable to one’s own dignity.”
And: “The equality of agent and recipient implied by the rule requires that a relationship be understood as basically a relationship between equals.”
I suspect that the assumptions that: a) the agent would actively seek guidance from the exercise of rule-related analysis and, b) would proceed from the assumption of equal dignity and equality of all parties; limits the population for whom his prescriptions might be operative.
While Wattles does not subscribe to a utilitarian-style weighing of assigned values among those affected by an action or decision, he does, like the utilitarians, stress the point that the rule is critically a matter of relationship.
He writes: “Most of all, the rule takes place in an ethics of relationship. It construes action, first and foremost, not as a quest for self-actualization, nor as a theme for reasoning, nor as determined by social structures, but as interaction…the rule is designed primarily for relationships.”
He further limits it in these terms: “The golden rule is, first and foremost, a principle in the philosophy of living, expressing a personal standard for the conduct of one-to-one relationships.” And: “The rule illuminates social systems, but its primary benefit is to individuals.”
Although he does acknowledge that the agent consideration must extend beyond personal relationships “since a sensitive application of the rule takes into account those indirectly affected by one’s actions”.
As much as Wattles’ personal views move strongly toward the positive he does not fail to acknowledge the darker elements of rule interpretation. He writes: “The golden rule, if decontextualized, presented as an abstract, eleven-word slogan, and put under an analytic microscope, may seem to encourage a well-intentioned agent to impose unwelcome burdens…Making assumptions about what is good for others can obviously lead to harm, especially when moralistic dogmatism is reinforced by religion.”
Having acknowledged the potential for damage in the name of “good”, though, Wattles moves quickly to conclude that “applying the golden rule puts subtle pressure on the conception of the ideal (e.g. God): the ideal consistent with the golden rule is one that diffuses itself by appeal, even persuasion, but not coercion…The rule prompts fair discussion in which the appropriate resolution may be ultimately agreed upon.”
He writes: “…in order for the golden rule to work reliably, one must assume that the agent has a normal capacity for sympathetic consideration for others’ feelings and a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”
In his concluding chapter Wattles moves beyond the relationship between agent and recipient, and he moves beyond his formal philosophical constructs. He expresses his personal views thoroughly informed by his scholarly work but firmly based in a faith in both God and man, both in the right and the good.
He observes: “The previous histories indicate that the golden rule is most cherished where morality is conceived primarily in terms of relationships and where people share a commitment to humankind as one family.” “In the religious ethics of relationship proposed here, one’s primary relationship is with God, the Source Personality…God is never merely one’s own Parent, but always also the Parent of others, and this is the origin of the brotherhood of man…Experiencing by faith what it is to live as a son or daughter of God, one comes to live as a brother or sister in relation to others. In this light, the golden rule becomes the principle of the practice of the family of God.”
This, then, is the fundamental conclusion of Wattles’ exhaustive study of the history of the rule as processed and reformulated through his own moral, religious, philosophical and ethical understandings.
It is: “The principle of the practice of the family of God.”
Specific religious convictions, traditions, scriptures and practices might obstruct the embrace of a “family of God” approach, Wattles acknowledges but “the golden rule is a balm for an overly theologized religious consciousness.”
“Much of the meaning of the rule can be put into practice without any religious commitment, since it is a non-theological principle”, but “from a religious perspective it means relating with other people as a brother or sister.”
One of Wattles’ key conclusions is that “The rule cannot be captured in a static interpretation for it engages the thoughtful doer in a process of growth. To follow it to the end is to move from egoism to sympathy…Whoever practices the golden rule opens himself or herself to a process of change…growth results unconsciously as the personality engages wholeheartedly in experience.”
His concluding sentence captures much of his message:
“Only a principle so flexible can serve as a moral ladder for all humankind.”
I respect Wattles’ analysis and his personal vision, which is unapologetically optimistic and idealistic. I do have some thoughts about his conclusions, some of which I can outline now, others need a little more time to germinate.
First, Wattle’s conclusion seems to me to limit the size of the population for which it is of practical value. It assumes a level of moral and spiritual development that I think is far from universal. And it assumes not only a willingness but an affirmative impulse toward spiritual growth and moral action that is probably even more limited.
Those limitations do not argue against Wattles’ conclusion; only against them as universally applicable in a practical sense.
I would point to the utilitarians’ motivation to prescribe an ethic that would form the basis for a penal code as one that has, of necessity, a broad (though not universal) application compared to Wattles’.
Secondly, while Wattles makes it very clear that application of the Rule in actual behavior requires that it be interpreted in various modified forms, he does not find the distinction between the “positive” and “negative” forms of the Rule to be as significant as I do.
Wattles’ acknowledges the need to provide for modifications to specify rational behavior, similar situations, empathetic consideration of the desires of others, etc.
He does not, however, seem to find the difference between taking action and refraining from action to be as significant as I find them.
Wattles finds, inherent in the Rule itself, both self correcting mechanisms and self editing mechanisms by which he suggests misinterpretations of the rule as stated can be avoided. However, the mechanisms he describes require a level of self control, thoughtfulness and moral clarity that might be present in a small community of like-minded “brothers and sisters” but will not be found, I believe, in the broader population.
I will return to Wattles’ work after I’ve given more time to a few issues that are not yet fully formed. But I will return with the greatest of respect for the author and his work.
copyright 2017: Charles R Lightner