I’ve suggested that the formula found in most religions, cultures and philosophies that holds that, in the words of Hillel “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow” should be viewed as a fundamental Ethic of Restraint.
It is incorrect to view it as a “negative” formulation of the Golden Rule idea. While it is stated in terms of avoiding unwanted behavior, that avoidance is not really a negative, it is as positive in its intent and effect as any behavioral injunction.
Similarly, it is incorrect to label it, as some have, as “the Silver Rule”. That label is inherently prejudicial because it is used to compare it to the “Golden Rule”. And, as I’ve argued, attaching the “golden” label to an idea immediately creates a prejudice in its favor when compared with any competing idea. And it does so, whether warranted or not, simply by the force of common implications of language.
My original idea for this study envisioned a comparison of the ethical and behavioral implications of the three “rules” that have come to be called Silver. Gold and Platinum.
The “Silver” rule I’ve come to call The Ethic of Restraint and, as I’ve recently written, I have become convinced that no effective ethical system can be complete without a reflective and restorative process. Those I’ve come to call the Ethic of Repair, which has two parts” reflection and rectification.
That still leaves the issues of the so-called “Golden” and “Platinum” rules, both of which involve acting, as opposed to restraining from action.
I disagree with those – as I’ve previously written – who say that acting is simply the inverse of not acting. I won’t reargue that point here. There will be ample analysis of that in the final version of the overall statement.
But I do want to suggest here an approach to analysis and understanding of these two other “rules”.
The Golden Rule, understood in its “Do unto others” formula is ultimately modified, in some respect, by all the major scholars who have addressed it. It is acknowledged that, without modification, it leads to intractable logical problems.
I think that Jeffrey Wattles solves the problem as well as any have in his finding that consistency of action is at its heart and that it must be understood as being applied in similar situations. He argues that it is not an ethic of reciprocity but, rather, one of consistency. And I agree.
The Platinum Rule is a much more recent formulation and it literally arose as a footnote in a book by the 20th century philosopher, Karl Popper. Popper suggested, without any analysis and in an almost offhand way – to the extent that any serious philosopher can be said to make offhand comments – that the Golden Rule might be improved by proposing that we should treat others, as far as possible, as they would want us to treat them.
This formulation has greater risk of misuse and more logical inconsistency than either the silver or gold formulations and, as I’ve previously noted, was clearly not fully developed by Popper. But it has, nevertheless, become a part of the conversation and so needs to be addressed.
While there is a history of thoughtful consideration of the typical version of the Golden Rule, the same is not true of Popper’s variation. At a minimum, though, we can say that it suggests a high level of confidence in the desires of the “other” and, therefore, a closer relationship.
There are those who argue for the possible universality of the Golden Rule formulation. I don’t agree. But it should be clear that, whatever the scope of potential Golden Rule application, the scope of application of the Platinum Rule is much more restricted.
It assumes, after all, that we know what the other wants. It is more specific, more personal, more intimate, than the Golden Rule. And yet it also carries the risk of misunderstanding, inconsistency of desire and inappropriateness of desire. To refer back to an example often used in Golden Rule analysis, it might be very clear that a masochist would like me to hurt him. That doesn’t mean I should act on his desire.
Is there a way to characterize the obligation I have towards another when my action will purposely affect him? And, if there is, how do I distinguish between the more general case that Wattles suggests calls for a consistency of action and the more specific case that Popper’s variation raises?
What comes between the Ethic of Restraint and the Ethic of Repair?
I think, provisionally, that the common requirement of action that purposely affects others is respect.
It seems to me that an Ethic of Respect might be understood as having two parts:
1. The Ethic of Consistency: which is the modified version of the Golden Rule as suggested by Wattles (and others, including Gensler), and
2. The Ethic of Consideration: which I see as Popper’s variation modified to propose that, to the extent we know what the other wants, we give due consideration to that desire when we decide how to act.
This explicitly does not require that we do what the other wants, and it would explicitly acknowledge that we can never be certain of what is really wanted. However, under circumstances where we have some information about what the other wants, we should consider it, if we are able to do so, in deciding how to act.
©Charles R. Lightner