Without naming them, or identifying them as such, we’ve discussed in prior posts the three main approaches to moral philosophy.
1. In discussion of the virtue-building systems of Aristotle and Benjamin Franklin we have presented and briefly discussed examples of Virtue, or ontological philosophy.
2. In discussions of the Ten Commandments, the Seven Noahide Laws, the Five (and Ten) Principles of Taoism and the Five Principles of Buddhism we’ve presented and briefly discussed examples of Non-consequentialist, of deontological philosophy.
3. In discussion of utilitarianism, whether of the original Bentham/Mill variety of the more complex versions of act/rule or direct/indirect utilitarianism we’ve presented and briefly discussed examples of consequentialist, or teleological philosophy.
While the virtue system and rules-based deontological systems are different in important respects they are both distinguishable from the teleological systems in that they are non-consequentialist. So, in some respects they can be discussed as similar.
We have also briefly discussed in prior posts the distinction between the schools of thought that hold that only one’s intention can be looked to in judging action. Kant was led to that conclusion by the fact that we can never be sure what will result from our actions and that, therefore, we cannot be judged on result. That is a non-consequentialist approach to morality and ethics.
The hadith of Intention Only Matters, in the collection of hadith of al Nawwawi, is a non-consequentialist approach in a religio-philosophical system.
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the two founding voices of utilitarianism, held the opposite view; that only the results of actions matter in assessing their goodness. An action that produces a good outcome is good, by definition, because of the goodness of the consequences. That is a consequentialist point of view.
Now, our study here seeks to make some sense of the ideas labelled The Golden Rule, The Silver Rule and The Platinum Rule. In the labels themselves we can see that these ideas represent non-consequentialist approaches to moral philosophy.
We can easily accept that our subject proceeds from a non-consequentialist view. But which non-consequentialist view? Is it necessary to select one? Can an approach to proper behavior towards others be built on a foundation that includes both virtue and rule-based premises? I think it is clear that it can.
How so? The cultivation of virtues, it seems to me, represents an essential element in the adoption of and adherence to appropriate rules.
When Benjamin Franklin determined that Temperance was a virtue to be cultivated, it was implicit that the acquisition of Temperance would be reflected in and cultivated through specific behaviors. The regulation of the appetites of the body could only be demonstrated by measurement of action and the essence of such a measurement is the comparison to a standard or benchmark. Such a standard is the concrete representation of a rule.
Stated differently, the acquisition of a virtue is demonstrated by explicit actions that are susceptible of measurement. And explicitly performed actions susceptible of measurement are the expressions of rules.
In concluding that we are almost certainly to find our answers in the areas on non-consequentialist morality and ethics, are we to say that there is no value in consequentialist thinking? After all, utilitarianism has been embraced by a large segment of the philosophical community for nearly two hundred years. And not only – perhaps not even most importantly – in the field of moral philosophy. Utilitarianism is an influential approach in political, economic and legal philosophy and in the practical fields of economics, sociology and government.
The consequentialist approach has great intuitive appeal and it’s hard to argue with the most simply-stated notion that what is right is what produces the greatest good. Where the idea fails, as it is so clearly demonstrated by Bernard Williams in “Utilitarianism: For and Against”, is when its premises are examined very closely and its actual implementation contemplated.
There are serious conceptual and practical problems with the adoption of utilitarianism, and those arise most clearly when the implementation is being attempted at the level of individual behavior. However, the intuitive appeal is as strong as it is for a reason: who can argue with the idea that we should act in the way that seems likely to produce the greatest good. The problem arises when we try to systematize the calculation of “the greatest good”. It just becomes more than can be asked of a person with a need to make a decision about action to be taken in real time.
Is there an alternative to the unworkable calculation problem? I think there is an answer but that it will not be seen as satisfactory to utilitarians. I think it is found in the idea of the “state of affairs” approach. That is, even if an individual relies primarily on a rules-based approach to deciding on the rightness of an action to be taken, he will almost certainly, if not explicitly, be asking the consequentialist question: What action will produce the best resulting state of affairs?
The idea of the “state of affairs” will include an intuitive, probably non-explicit and nearly instantaneous, assessment of a broad range of results that might be manifest in individuals and situations that flow from the actual action decided upon. It might seem that we make decisions that are specific to a given matter at hand and involve specific affected individuals but, in fact, all of our decisions are made in the context of all that we know that might influence them whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether that context is conscious, subconscious or preconscious.
I’m arguing here that we implicitly ask ourselves the fundamental utilitarian question when considering an action even if we hold strongly to a non-consequentialist view of moral philosophy and ethics.
©Charles R. Lightner