In prior posts I’ve noted some of the many instances where we find a culture that defines responsibilities among individuals differently depending on the relationship between or among them. There are two reasons to be emphasize that point.
First, those who hold that the ethical standard we should aspire to is to “Love your neighbor as yourself” argue that it is to be understood in a universal sense. Some suggest this as the specific spiritual genius of Jesus, that he universalized what was previously particular.
It is important to understand that, while that might be an aspirational spiritual goal, it is different from an ethical standard, which might proceed from a spiritual motivation, but is expressed in actual behavior, not in emotion or sentiment.
Secondly, as we approach discussion of The Ethic of Respect it is important to understand that all cultures, in one way or another, create a system of preferences or priorities that attach to our responsibilities toward one another.
As much as we might want to have the same level of concern about all other humans, we simply don’t. We live at the center of a series of concentric circles of concern. Those who occupy the inner circles are of greater concern to us than those in the outer circles.
In an earlier post on The Ethic of Restraint I discussed the Ten Commandments in the context of behavior between persons. I think it’s useful to make the point that the Commandments clearly demonstrate the idea of circles of concern.
At the center we find specification about our responsibilities toward God.
Next in priority is the respect we owe our parents. In this case we can think of parents as a proxy for those closest to us; immediate family, perhaps.
Then, we have our neighbors, whose property we are not to covet.
Next, we are prohibited from swearing falsely, which is understood to include matters affecting the community as administered via the judicial system.
And, finally, there are issues respecting all persons i.e. murder, theft, prohibited sexual relations, etc.
Contrast this responsibility structure, proceeding from God through to everyman, with the view of Aristotle and others of his time.
As David Ross puts it in his Introduction to The Nicomachean Ethics:
“The idea that we might have obligations to others simply as such is completely absent from Aristotle…” and
“…the idea that we should try to alleviate suffering and help our fellow men no matter how remote from us is quite foreign to Aristotle and indeed to all at his time…”
Aristotle clearly saw obligations extending toward his fellow citizens and even toward those other residents of the state who were not citizens. But those were of a different order and magnitude than his principle concern, which was the obligation toward friends.
And not all friends or friendships are equal.
“Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves… But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare…”
“Friendship because of pleasure bears a resemblance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other.
And “…friendship because of utility; for the good are also useful to each other.”
Each of those relationships is approached differently when considering what behavior is just.
“There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates, and the injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a father than anyone else. And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an equal extension.”
Ross, David. The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford World’s Classics) (pp. 153-154). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.
Clearly, even in the case where no general obligations toward others as simple reflection of common humanity is found, there is a distinction of obligation based on strength or status of relationship.
Finally, a point made by Aristotle on the issue of deliberateness of action, or choice. This will come into our discussion of the Ethic of Respect.
Obviously, many of the actions that a person takes on any given day are not the result of current conscious deliberation. As I’ve written previously, a very high percentage of what we do today is simply a repetition of what we did yesterday and a good predictor of what we’ll do tomorrow.
Aristotle wrote:
“Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a subject of possible deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things? We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done…Now, different things appear to be good to different people, and, if it so happens, even contrary things…”
In the first part of that statement I think it would be fair to add the term “only”. That is: we can really only “deliberate” if we have choice among possible actions. If there is no choice, there is no need to deliberate. But the second passage quoted makes the point that is critical to Aristotle, as cited in a prior post, that good men can disagree on the goodness of an action.
If even good men can disagree on the goodness of an action, reliance on self-referential standards is a perilous thing!
©Charles R. Lightner