Material quoted here is drawn from the paper by Christine Swanton, professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, which was published in “Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology and Psychology” edited by Nancy E. Snow, Oxford University Press, 2015.
The two problems for virtue ethics that Swanton addresses in this paper are:
1. The “self-centeredness objection”, and
2. The problem of the inability to account for the right acts of the non-virtuous.
Self-centeredness:
The self-centeredness objection is based on the notion that the proper motivation for the performance of virtuous acts is the pursuit of one’s own virtue; cultivating it and maintaining it; for the primary end of one’s own “flourishing”.
The objection to virtue ethics on the basis that that one’s own flourishing is the primary motivation for virtuous acts is the “narcissism objection”.
In Swanton’s words:
“Since excellence of her own character is the finest good for an agent, and thereby the most central component of eudaimonia (flourishing), her own virtue possession is what a virtuous (or would-be virtuous) agent pursues and is ultimately motivated by, for that is what ultimately benefits her. This motivation is intolerably narcissistic and is surely not the mark of virtue.”
She suggests, however:
“It may seem that there is a way out of this problem. Why assume, as do at least many contemporary eudaimonists, that the final end of the agent is her own flourishing? If the final end (eudaimonia) is properly specified as ‘living well and finely’ and ‘doing well,’ then eudaimonia is merely a formal notion having no necessary connection with agent benefit.”
“…unless the ultimate grounds of virtue lie wholly in agent benefit, not even the ultimate motivations of a virtuous agent (living well) are self-centered.”
So, if there are elements in virtue that benefit, or are for the benefit of, others, we can’t really say that the virtuous acts of a person are wholly self-centered. And if they are not wholly self-centered, then the narcissism objection loses power.
Swanton proposes:
“A virtuous agent does not have as her greatest concern her possessing or cultivating virtue. Rather, she has as her highest commitment living a life of virtue—that is, acting, feeling, being motivated as virtue demands or commends.”
Here Swanton broadens the idea of the purpose of virtue. It is not, she suggests, only one’s own flourishing that motivates but more broadly the living of a virtuous life. When the aim is to live a virtuous life the effects of one’s actions on others who are a part of one’s life inevitably are brought into the analysis. Put another way she proposes that:
“One’s primary responsibility is to live one’s life according to virtue.”
“What virtue commends or requires in living a life ‘according to virtue’ is attaining the targets of virtue. Targets include such things as paying a debt and being motivated in doing so by the justice of honoring the debt rather than fear of being prosecuted. A person committed to leading a life of virtue is committed to attaining these targets in various situations, even if she cannot as yet in many areas act in the way a virtuous agent characteristically acts.
“Thus, virtue as a character trait is indeed something to be developed and worked on, and an agent should be committed to such ongoing work. On this understanding of the commitments of virtue ethics, the complex of problems dubbed the ‘self-centeredness objection’ can be overcome in a virtue ethics having the following tenets.
(a) The features which make traits of character virtues are determined by their targets, aims, or point, as opposed to the flourishing of the possessor of the virtues
(b) Hitting the targets of (relevant) virtues is what makes actions right.
(c) What fundamentally motivates a virtuous agent, and should motivate an agent aspiring to virtue, is attaining the targets of the virtues: the cultivation and maintenance of virtue is secondary to this aim.”
Swanton, then overcomes the self-centeredness objection by redefining the primary aim of virtue. The question is not, in the first instance, one’s own flourishing. It is in leading a virtuous life. And in the second instance, the virtuous characteristic is found in the action that is expressive of the virtue. It is not found primarily in its contribution to the cultivation of that virtue in the one acting.
Accounting for the Acts of the Non-Virtuous:
Swanton introduces the second objection as follows:
“In an objection to virtue ethics owed to Robert Johnson, virtue ethics cannot account for right acts of the non-virtuous. These are acts that are intuitively thought to be right (such as breaking the less important promise when one culpably has made conflicting ones) but would not be performed by a virtuous agent (who does not culpably make conflicting promises). In particular, standard virtue ethical accounts of rightness cannot account for the right acts of self-improving agents.”
Swanton proposes overcoming that objection by positing “a virtue of excellence in striving for improvement in leading a virtuous life, a virtue of self-improvement if you will”.
In this discussion Swanton points out the critical fact that we humans, who might strive to be fully virtuous, are nevertheless not fully virtuous.
The implication is that our real task, or perhaps the real virtue, is not to actually be fully virtuous but rather to aspire to and work toward that end. As we strive, undertaking the sort of practices that Aristotle and others prescribe for gaining in virtue, we will inevitably sometimes fail. And that must be accepted and allowed.
Swanton gives an example of a person who makes a charitable contribution of what might be considered by most to be a very small amount. This person, though, is “very stingy” and “rarely gives away a cent”. In this case the action is a major improvement on typical behavior. How can that not be considered “being generous for her”?
“She has exercised the virtue of self-improvement, and as a consequence—given that as Russell allows, virtue is a satis or threshold concept—we may judge her to have performed a right act, all things considered.” It may not be actually generous “but it does hit the target of other relevant virtues, notably that of self-improvement…”
Swanton brings several arguments and examples to illustrate the “aspirational” quality of virtue, which both Aristotle and Kant acknowledge. In one she quotes a conversation cited by Angle
“…where the interviewer says: ‘Some people would say, ‘Where do you get off thinking you’re different from everyone and can love the children of others as much as your own?’ to which he replies: “All the great religious traditions of the world say, Love thy neighbor as thyself. My answer is, I’m sorry, I can’t but I’m gonna keep on trying.”’
Indeed, as Aristotle also saw, performing virtuous acts is at one and the same time training oneself into virtue.
And Kant has said that in pursuing the duty to be virtuous a person’s “compliance with this duty can consist only in continual progress.” Kant not only recognizes the aspirational quality of virtue but also tells us much about the nature of the virtues of self-improvement.
In fact, the whole idea of cultivating virtue is grounded in the acknowledgment that one is not fully virtuous. The notions of aspiration, striving and practice all assume the need to acquire something that is currently not possessed, or to maintain something that is impermanently held.
“By definition the virtue of self-improvement has the self as its target. This is no problem for Kant, for whom the aspirational duties of cultivating virtue and sympathy are at the heart of human morality.
And as Kant saw, we are all to some extent virtue-fragile: “Virtue is always in progress…. It is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a duty…, if it is not rising, [it] is unavoidably sinking.”
This certainly seems right. “Constant approximation to it…” is a wonderful phrase.
According to Swanton:
“…virtue ethics has proceeded in an ideal- world way with concepts appropriate to a situation where agents are already perfected in virtue. There has been a neglect of the developmental strengths required for the acquisition of virtue—strengths described by psychologists such as Erik Erikson—and a consequent assumption that virtue cultivation is a matter simply of emulating the exemplars of virtue.”
Conclusion:
Swanton, therefore, proposes to overcome the two objections to virtue ethics by:
1. Finding the fundamental good in the acquisition of virtue to be the living of a virtuous life rather than the flourishing of the individual actor, and
2. Finding a virtue of self-improvement to be a fundamental motivation for the right actions of persons not yet (fully) virtuous.
The value of raising the objections that Swanton discusses seems to me to be in challenging them to be refuted. That has value.
It seems to me that Swanton’s suggestions are both sensible and compelling.
©Charles R. Lightner