If we look at a variety of definitions of the term “ethic” or “ethics” the first definition provided most often relates to action. The second is typically related to the moral code or set of values from which the action derives.
In Part 2 we concluded that in terms of the Ethic of Reciprocity the critical issue is “do or don’t do”. In part, we are driven to that conclusion by the name itself.
Reciprocity assumes interaction, or at least the potential of it; or the openness to it; and interaction assumes more than one individual.
Accepting that the relevant statement of The Ethic of Reciprocity is “do / don’t do” simplifies matters because it bypasses the question of metaphysical influence. Does that, or should that, matter for this discussion?
If I am a committed atheist, does it matter to me that someone, somewhere is praying that I be inspired to embrace some form of religious belief? Probably not.
But if that person knocks on my door and presses me to accept a particular savior, or literature with scriptural verses and prophecies, that’s probably a different matter.
Studies done on the power of prayer and of distance healing and of small groups meditating together to create behavioral change in larger society are interesting and, in some cases, compelling. I don’t discount them at all. But, while those might be considered “doing”, our concern here is for the physical, not the metaphysical. For the tangible, observable and objective.
How should humans act with and towards one another? In what ways are we able to act with and towards one another? Is the term act even appropriate? Is influence or, perhaps affect , a better way to think about the issue?
If you and I are within arm’s-length we can act toward one another directly, physically. I can touch you. You can touch me.
If I give a hungry person food to eat I am acting directly and in apparent accordance with (at least) the Golden Rule. That is: if I were hungry I would probably want someone to give me food to eat.
But, how do I really know that he is hungry? Is it by his dress? His state of cleanliness? The fact that he is sheltering in a doorway? It might be that he is hungry or he might be mentally ill or distraught and disheveled for other reasons.
If he specifically asked me for food, though, or he was holding a sign saying “I am Hungry – Please Help”, I could be relatively sure that he was hungry. If I gave him food under those circumstances I am probably acting in accordance with the Platinum Rule. That is: I am doing unto him as he would have me do.
But that is a case of direct interpersonal action.
Can I also act directly to affect those who are at a distance?
I might send food to those who are hungry. I must have some awareness of the need and the ability to acquire the food and the facility to send it to the appropriate place.
Or, I can send money to the person who is hungry so he can buy food himself.
But I might have a desire to help those who are hungry and have no direct connection to hungry persons. In that case I might send money to another person or to a group that will use it to buy and furnish food to the hungry.
Or, at a further remove, my ability to affect the cause of feeding the hungry might be expressed by my voting for an individual running for a public office who shares my care for those in need of food aid.
In each of these non-direct cases I am engaging in an action, a doing, that expresses my desire and intent. In none of them am I assured that the impact will be as I intend, however.
The more removed from the situation of direct personal interaction, the less confident I can be that my doing will have the intended effect.
In the direct case, if I offered a person food and he said he’d rather have money, my level of certainty might falter. He might want the money for alcohol or drugs, for instance. What, then, is the ethical calculus?
It depends on the level of certainty we can ascribe to his statement of desire.
If we cannot trust that we know what the person really wants, is action in accordance with the Platinum Rule possible?
If the person is an alcoholic and wants money for alcohol, how do I think about application of the Golden Rule? Can I say that I know what I would want done to or for me in the same circumstance?
If the alcoholic is a stranger on the street I might assume with some assurance that he wants a drink to relieve his craving. But what if that person is an acquaintance; someone with marital, financial or emotional problems that I have some knowledge of?
What if I have some reason to believe that he would be open to a different sort of relief? I might offer a different sort of help.
The action I take; or might think appropriate; will be influenced by the level of my certainty of the person’s condition and of his request (or apparent need) for the help; the doing.
Even in cases of individual-to-individual ethical decisions, there is ambiguity. But as my relationship to the affected person is less direct, my ability to assess his condition diminishes and my ability to confidently anticipate his desires diminishes.
I’ll quote Jonathan Sacks again:
“That is what makes classic theories of morality inadequate. They fail to distinguish between kin and non-kin, neighbour and stranger. They account for altruistic behavior within the group. They tell us: treat the alike, alike. What they do not fully confront is the problem of altruistic behaviour beyond the group. Why should I behave well to someone not like me?” The more like me another person is, the more likely I can correctly anticipate his wants. The more like me a group is; the more a group represents my own sense of what is right, just and proper; the more likely I can anticipate what members of that group will want or find acceptable.
Two things, I think, are clear:
1. The character of a “doing” necessarily varies with the degree to which the doer can act directly to affect and control the doing, and
2. The confidence with which I can assess the needs and desires of another individual decreases as my actual knowledge of the individual, or of the group of which the individual is a part, decreases.
©Charles R Lightner