Material quoted here is drawn from the paper by Ross A. Thompson, Professor of Psychology at The University of California at Davis, which was published in “Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology and Psychology” edited by Nancy E. Snow, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Thompson reviews “the results of recent studies relevant to the development of virtuous character in the early years and its implications for the psychology of moral development and for virtue theory”.
The bulk of the material Thompson discusses relates to children in the 18-month to 5-year-old age range.
In his study of recent work in the field he finds:
“Newer research…can be summarized in this way. Far from being egocentric, early-developing conceptual and emotional skills provide the basis for a primitive ‘premoral sensibility’ as young children become sensitive to others’ feelings and goals, make morally relevant evaluations of others’ conduct based on human needs, and become capable of cooperative and prosocial action. This early-emerging premoral sensibility is refined in early childhood…”
…This new, post-Kohlbergian view suggests that the cultivation of virtue begins early in life as young children are developing a sense of who they are in relation to others.”
“Taken together, these studies suggest that from a very early age, young children are constructing a rudimentary understanding of why people act as they do—more specifically, the internal, mental states that account for people’s actions. Along with their understanding that people act on the basis of their perceptions and sensations, they also become aware that intentions, desires, emotions, and goals are also significant motivators of human conduct.”
The connection of emotion understanding to others’ needs and interests and the sharing of that emotion may also contribute, for some children, to the development of virtuous qualities such as compassion and respect for others.”
While Thompson presents very interesting data regarding the presence of and cultivation of morality in children he is quick to point out the limited nature of the data available and limited value it currently has for the drawing of inferences about virtue cultivation in later life. Clearly parenting does have an important impact but cognitive development is a lengthy process in maturing humans, continuing well into or past teenage years.
Since our concern is the ability of an adult to purposely cultivate and use virtue and virtue ethics, the data available on children, while interesting, is of limited value. All the more so since, as Thompson writes:
“…little is known of how assessments of conscience are associated with young children’s behavior with people outside the family, such as peers and other adults. Extending research in this area to other contexts and partners will enable researchers to better understand the generality and robustness of the characteristics observed primarily with mothers in these studies.”
And…
“Little is known…about the early development of moral identity and how moral values become important to self-understanding and the development of virtuous character.”
However, one additional point that Thompson brings out is quite interesting. He writes:
“…mothers who discuss misbehavior in terms of the emotional consequences of morally relevant conduct are more likely to foster conscience development than those who focus on judgments of rule-oriented compliance.
Mothers whose children were most prosocial more often discussed people’s emotions and made more frequent evaluative comments about the child’s behavior in conversation. As in the studies of conscience, maternal discussion of rules and rule-based justifications for helping others was never associated with preschoolers’ actual helping in the lab.
In sum, research in this area suggests that positive moral dispositions develop in the context of responsive relationships of mutuality in the family and are enhanced in parent-child conversations that highlight the feelings and needs of others, rather than rule-oriented compliance.”
The findings that virtue-like concepts appear to be either more accessible to, understood by or important to children than rules-based concepts might just reflect the relative underdevelopment of cognitive ability in children.
On the other hand, it might be important in understanding the relative efficacy of different systems of behavioral standards for adults at different stages of emotional or psychological development. That is, some might be drawn naturally to virtue-based systems while others might be quite comfortable in rule-based systems.
This is an important idea that will be addressed at some length in our discussions of both The Ethic of Restraint and The Ethic of Respect.
©Charles R. Lightner